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ORIGIN AND HISTORY.
The origin and history of wills in the different count-
ries are not infrequently involved in obscurity and surround
ed by a mist of uncertainty through which historians are un-
able to penetrate. Historians and writers upon natural law
have been led, by a study of the records of mankind, to the
common chnclusion that title to real property was first ac-
quired by occupancy. The right, however, was only a tempor-
ary one and was determined by the death of the occupant. In
the course of time "as man increased in number, craft and
ambition, it became necessary to entertain conceptions of
more permanent dominion; and to appropriate to individuals
not the immediate use only but the very substance of the
thing to be used." It was clearly equitable that he, Yo
enhanced the value of property, by skill and labor during
his life time should have the privilege of naning the person
to succeed him in the enjoyment and possession. Full recog-
nition of the right in an individual to dispose of his title
to property at pleasure aid even in variance to usual rule5
of inheritance, soon followed, as the product of these con-
ceptions. "In this last recognition by society lies the
sanction."of a will." Nearly all nations have wisely en-
acted laws countenancing this instrument by which a person
continues, as it were, his legal existence and direction over
property after death.
A brief outline of the history of wills in England is
here appropriate. It seems sufficiently clear that property
was divisable by will in the time of the Saxons, and so con-
tinued until the introduction of the Feudal system by the
Normans, A.D. 1066. Various reasons are given for the abaw-
donment of testamentary dispositions which took place at t)-mt
time. Blackstone says "It naturally followed as a branch of
the feudal doctrine of non-alienation without the consent of
the lord;" moreover it was urged that livery of seiztn could
not be had or the land might fall into the hands of enemies
of the lord of the fee.
This restraint upon alienation by devise was evaded,
however, when "uses" were introduced, whereby property was
conveyed to one person to be held for the use of another
called the cestui Que trust. Courts of equity declared tha.t
uses were divisable although legal estates which supported
them were not. When the Statutes of Uses, 27 henry VIII.
was passed, the use became united to the legal estate and
tht* mode of devising lands was taken away and remained so
until the Statute of Wills, which was passed in the year 1541
or 32 Henry VIII. This statute provided that "One seized
in fee simple of lands, (except feme coverts, idiots and in-
sane persons) may devise by will in writing, (except to
bodies corporate) two-thirds of land held by them in military
tenure and all in socage tenure." This statute was a step
in the right direction but it was too broad in its nature.
To meet and remedy the many abuses and provide against the
many deceitful practices which followed, the Statute of
Frauds was passed. This statute required all instruments
devising lands, in order that they might be maifested and
proved, to be not only in writing but signed by the devisor
and attested by three or more creditable witnesses. Under
the statute 1 Vic. the testator is required to "subscribe"
and two competent witnesses are deemed sufficient.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A WILL.
Schouler defines a will as "the solemn disposition of
ones property to take effect after death." (see also Bouviers
Dict."Will") "The word itself naturally denotes purpose,
and hence, In our present technical sense, the authentic and
final declaration of that choice or purpose." The Roman
civil law supplief the significant word "Testament" which is
customarily linked with the word "will". The form of a will
is of little consequence provided that the intention of the
testator be plain. Many states have by statute made it nec-
essary for a will to be under seal, but all wills' except
nuncupative, must be iii writii,g' signed and attested. Nuncu-
pative wills are allowed oy most States when the testator is
"in extremis" and declares before witnesses the disposition
he wishes to make of his property. These wills are valid as
to personal propertyjif committed to writing within the statu-
tory periodland proved by two or more disinterested witnesses.
(1 Red. 211-2). "It is called an nuntupative wili," says
Swinburne, "because, when a man makes such a testament, he
must name his executor and declare his whole mind before
witnesses." (Swinb. 350.) The naming of' an executor is not
essential to any will in moaern times, nor to a total dis-
position af the estate. (Hubbard v Hubbard, 8 N.Y. 202.)
Nuncupative wills, being no favorites of the court, demani
strictness of proof and hence the cappcity of the deceased
and the animus testan i must appear, by the clearest and
most indisputable testimony. At common law any soldier in
actual military service or any mariner or seaman being at sea,
might dispose of his personal estate by an oral will. This
single exception was expressly retained in the Statute of
I Vic., while all other oral wills were virtually abolished.
(Act 1 Vic. c. 26 +11. ) This latest English policy is fol-
lowed in New York, Mass., and Va., where there have been re-
cent enactments on this subject.(Hubbard v Hubbari, 8 N.Y.
596; 2 Rev. Stat. N.Y., #22.) Under the American Codes, a
duly executed, written will cannot be revoked by an oral one.
(Brooks v Chapper, 34 Wis. 405.)
Joint or mutual wills exists where one promises to make
a will in favor of a second person, who in consequence,
thereof, agrees to make a similiar will in favor of the first'
the advantage thus to accrue being to such of the two as may
survive the other. This branch of the law of wills is in a
somewhat confused state. Some cases appear to confine the
rule to wills which are to operate exclusively in favor of
the survivor. (Lewis v Scofield, 26 Conn. 452; Evans v Smith
26 Ga. 98.)
Two species of wills derived from the Roman Code are of
minor interest in that they were introduced in Louisiana be-
fore its incorporation with the Union. viz.: the*Mystic
testament which consists in inclosing ones will in a sealed
envelope in the presence of witnesses; and the "Holographic
testament" which is peculiar in that it is written wholly by
the testator himself, thereby proving itself without the for-
mality of witnesses. (La. Civ. Code, 1581; 4 Kent Com. 519-20)
WHO NMAY MARE A WILL.
A person in order to make a valid will must possess at
least two requisites. (1) He must have sufficient mental ca-
pacity. (2) He must be free from any legal disability. There
fore it follows, as a general rule, that any person of sound
mind and memory, who has reached the age prescribed and regu-
lated by statute, and who is under no legal disability or
constraint of will, may be deemed cap7ble of making a will.
No definite canon as to what constitutes sufficient mental
capacity, or as is expressed in the more popular phrase,
"sound mind and memory" can be fairly stated. As a general
proposition, the testator may be considered legally capable
of making a will when he underst.nd , without prompting, the
nature of a will. the kinrl \ exteint 0 ois proxerty, the
persons who are the nritural objects of 1Lis bounty and the
marmer in which he desires the disposition to take effect.
(Thompson v Lyner, 65 Pa. St. 365) In GreenWood v Green-
wood, 3 Curt. App. 2, 30, the rule is more briefly stated by
Lord Kenyon. "He must have that degree of' recolection that
would eiiable him to look about the property and the persons
to whom he disposes it." (In also Kimie v Kimie, 9 Conn. 102)
The vital question appears to be whether or not a particular
instrument is the disposition of a mind "neither deranged in
producing it, nor operating under stres of error, fraud or
undue influence." Diseases of the mind are manifested in
several different forms. The early common law drew no fine
line of distinction between persons sui JLuris and those non
compotes, which last class of unfortunate beings was harshly
described in the vocabulary as "mad men, lunatics, idiots,
and natural fools." Insanity has been defined by high
authorities as the "prolonged departure without adequate
cause, from the states of feeling and modes of thinking,
usual to the individual in health." (Bouv. Dict.) "It there-
fore involveswe may assume, disorder of the will and feeling
as well as of the intellect. H.ence the feebleness of volit-
ion which easily subjects one to the coernion of those about
him, causing the will to justly fail of probatt, on the ground
of undue influence." When insanity is limited to a certain
subject or object, it is known as monomania. The courts
hold that monomania will only invalidate a will which is
identified with the particular delusion. (Pd~dcock v Potter,
68 Pa.St. 342.) The great characteristic of idiocy, which
is the lowest type of insanity, and presupposes a lack of un-
derstading from nativity, is permanence, with little or no
variation.
The civil disability of an idiot or utter imbecile is
complete. The old doctrine that deaf mutes might be pre-
sumed idiots has long since been thoroughly repudiated. Miere
blindness is an impediment only in that more satisfactory
evidence that the testator understood the contents of the
will is required. (1 Red. on Wills, 52.) Suicide of the
testator is not conclusive of insanity and the chief value
of this proof consists in the corroboration it affords when
considered with other facts and symptons,to the theory of
mental deficiency. (Duffield v Morris, 2 Harring 375.)
As to that form of mental aberration, known as delirium,
which results from excessive use of intoxicants or is inci-
dent to fevers, Mr. Schouler says: "It stands to reason that
a will made by a person when delirious, is null if not a
legal absurdity." Mania or delirium is destinguished from
dementia, in that the former is characterized by "force, hur-
ry and intensity," while the latter is marked by"mental
feebleness and decreptitude so that reason flickers low
in the socket and then dies out."
In the case of Boyse vs. Rossborough, 6 H. & .. Cas.
45, Lord Cranworth has justy #aid of testamentary incapa'ity
that the question is almost always one of degree. "There is
no difficulty," he says, "in the case of a raving madman or a
drivelling idiot, in saying that he is not a person capable
ef disposing of property. There is no possibility of mis-
taking midnight for noon, but at what precise moment twilight
becomes darkness is hard to determine." Although a testa-
tor may be of sound mind and memory, yet he may be so coro-
pletely under the control* of others as to be incapable of
making a will that reflects his wishes and desires, and this
is what is termed im law undue influence. The term is de-
fined in (Turner v. Cheesman, 15 N.1.4q., 243) as "That what
compels one to do that which is against his will, from fear,
the desire of peace, or some feeling which he is unable to
resist." When such an i:proper influence is exercised by
one standing in a confidential or fiduciary relation towards
the testator as prevents the latter from exercising an un-
biased judgment and in all cases where free agency is destroy.
ed, the will thus made is of no effect. It is not however
unlawfu l for one, proipted by disinterested and honorable
motives, to honestly advise or even influence the te-tator
to make a disposition of his property by simply appealing to
his better judgment. The influence of affection and at-
taclment such as induces the desire to gratify, is not undue
in any legal sense.. The constraint, fraud or undue in-
fluence in order to avoid a will must be so identified with
the execution of it "that the influence operated upon the tes-
tator's mind in the very act of making the instrument."
(Eckert v. Floury, 43 Penn. St., 4().
At comon law a feme covert could not make a valid will
but in the United States the late tendency of legislation
is to free married women from all disability in respect to
the management of their own property. In some states they
are enabled to dispose of both their legal and equitable es-
tates and bar whatever contingent interests others may haVe
in their property, including curtesy. (Dickinson v. Dickin-
son, 61 Penn.St., 401). In other states where they have
not an absolute estate in their real property, they are un-
able to bar the husband's tenancy by the curtesy. (Burroughs
v. Nutting, 105 Mass., 228).
At common lw testaments disposing of personalty might
be mad, by infants of fourteen years of age if males, and
twelve if females. In this country the law requires the
testator to be twenty-one years of age, in the case of males,
while many of the states confer the power on temales of
eighteen years of age. The old comnon 1 w with undue sever-
ity, inflicted the penalty )f incapacity upon many classes
with a view, as suggested by some authors, of' enabling the
Crown to seize upon their property and confiscate it. Swin-
burne eimmerates among these, "slaves, villeins, prisonevs,
traitors, felons, heretics, apostates, outlawed persons,
those excommunicated and prodigals," a promiscuous list in
which criminal law breakers, wrong doers, and innocent unfor-
tunates are found unhappily blended. (Swinb. pt. 3, #7;
2 Bk. Corn., 499).
As a result of the beneficial influence of public opin-
ion existing in this country for the past century, scarcely
any of the disqualifications now exist. The single case of
what is termed "civil death" seems to be the last remnant of
the old law of criminal disqualification. As in the case of
Rankin v. Rankin, 6 Monr. (Ky.) 551, it is even held that a
person under sentence of death may make his will. Aliens at
the present time have the unquestioned right of disposing
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of their personal estate at pleasure. Moreover, modern
legislation is to the ef-ect that an alien's disposition of
real estate will confer a good title upon the devisee as
against all but the State.
PUBLICATION AND REVOCATION.
(Execution and Attestation.)
The term publication in this connection signifies, that
the testator has done some act from which it may reasonably
be inferred that he intended the instrument to operate as his
will. As to what act will be deemed a publication, it may
be said in general that the production of the instrument by
the testator for the purpose of attestation is sufficient.
A will once revoked can omly be republished by an instrm-
ment of as high a nature as that which revoked it. Thus an
instrumndt revoked by a written declaration cannot be repub-
lished by parol. The effect of republication is to make a
new will which speaks from the date of the republication and
therefore revokes as of its date all former wills inconsistent
with its terms.
The same degree of capacity is required for the revoca-
tion as for the execution of a will. There are several ways
in which the revocation may be effected. First by intention-
ally tearing, destroying, cancelling, or obliterating by the
testator or by his agent. "A will is revcked by any act
done to the instrument which stamps upon its face an inten-
tioh that it shall have no effect, though the act be nota
complete physical destruction." (Evans App.,58 Penn.St., 238).
Mere words however do not efft ect a revocation.
Second: by the execution of a subsequent in which all
former wills are expressly anulled. The same effect is
produced by the subsequent birth of a child, there being no
provision for such child in the will. (Brush v. Wilkinson,
4 John. Ch., 506). Children born after the execution of the
will, are the subject of broad ehactments, the policy of
which is to revoke the will only so far as to let them into
the share which would have fallen to them under the intestate
laws.
"A deed of conveyance made subsequently to the exec,,tion
of a will does not have the ef ect of a revocation unless it
makes an entire disposition of the estate. The will attaches
pro tanto to any part of the estate undisposed of and carries
it to the devisees." (Brush v. Brush, 11 Oh., 287). Nor w 11
it be revoked by an invalid conveyance subsequently made by
the testator (Bennett v. Yaddis, 79 Ind., 347).
The codicil is a kind of sequel to or conclusion of a
will. It does not ipso facto work a revocation unless it ex-
pressly provides for such revocation or its prevision are
repugnant to those of a will. And when the provisions in it
are inconsistent with those in the will it operates as a pro
tanto revoca,tion. (Tilden v. TildeTi, 13 (Tray, 103). "But
it does not revoke the instrument further than may be require-
ed by its express terms or necessary implication." (Collier
v. Coi-lier, 3 Oh., 369).
(Execution and Attestation)-- As local codes differ,
our present investigation of the essential formalities of ex-
ecution and attestation must be held strictly subject to
local variations of statute requirment. The Statute of
Frauds requires the will to be signed by the testator, to be
attested and subscribed by three witnesses, in his presence.
Under this statute it is sufficient if the testators name
appears in any part of the instrument snd thu signature my
be by marks instead of writing, "not withstanding he was able
to write at the time." (Cozzeris Will, 61 Pa.St., 196).
Mr. Schouler says that "a few American codes contain
peculiar provisions as- to the form, signature and attestation
of wills. Thus the Penn. Statute appears to have long dis-
pensed with formal attestation, even in a devise of lands,
provided the authenticity of the will can ne proved by two
competent witnesses." (See also 1 Jarm. Wills, Am. Ed. note;
High v. Wilson, 1 Watts, 463).
The Statute, 1 Vic., c. 26, wbid : has been adopted in
some of the states, declars that no will shall be valid un-
less in writing and signed at the foot or end thereof by the
testator. "Three witnesses are required in fourteen of the
states while two are held sufficient in the others. Witness-
es serve in a two-fold capacity- (1) to show that instrument
was executed by the testator; and (2) to judge of his testa-
mentary capacity at the time of his acknowledgement. Under
enactments adopted by the various states the policy of which
is to prevent substitution and fraud upon the testator, it
is requisite that the signing shall take place in the presence
of the testator. What may be regarded as presence depend7
on the circumstances of each case. if the witnesses are in
the same room where the testator can see them if he so de-
sires, they are to be considered as in his presence within
the meaning of the Act. it follows that it is not absolute-
ly necessary that they be in the same room or that he actual-
ly see them sign. (Mandeville v. Parker, 31 N.J.Eq., 242).
"Not only the corporeal presence of the testator is essential
to the validity of the attestation, but his mental accompani-
ment of their subscription." (Aurand v. Wilt, 9 Pa.St., 54).
The general rule of our states makes it essential that wit-
nesses should sign in the presence of one another. One who
takes under a will is not a competent witness and on the same
ground a wife is not a competent witness to her husband's
will. (Pease v. Alles, 110 Mass., 157). Nor would she be
competent to a will containing a devise to her husband. (Sul-
livan v. Peo, 106 Mass., 474). Mr. Redfield holds that
"this rule extends to executors where under the statute they
are entitled to commissions in personal estate." (1 Red. ,259)
WHAT MAY BE TRANSFERRED BY WILL.
According to the coiTauon law a devise of real estate was
looked upon as a conveyance and as such could extend only to
the land of-the testator at the date of the will and after ac-
quired land could not pass. This rule , however, has been
changed by statute in this country. The term "testamentary
gifts" includes both devises of real estate and bequests of
personalty. Prior to' ;he year 1066 A.D., tetamentary gifts
of real estate and personalty were equally valid. After
this period it seems that devises were not allowed, since
they were deemed inconsistent with FHudal principles, with
the single exception of the County of Kent which still retain-
ed the Anglo Saxon right to pass real estate by will.
This prohibition was abolished by the famous Statute of
Wills. (33 Hen.VIII.). And the modern rule is that all
property may pass by will whether legal or equitable in
nature. A widow's dower cannot be affected by will unless
something is given her in lieu of it and she then may elect
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which to take. The period in which she ma , make this elec-
tion is fixed by statute. In the case of (Jennings v.
Jennings, 21 Oh. St., 56) the court held that "the widow will
not be entitled to dw.v r in addition to the provision made
for her unless such intention clearly appears in the instru-
ment . .
WHO MAY TAKE' JNDER A WILL.
The general rule is that all natural persons are capable,
provided they are in esse at the time of the execution of tlv
will or are "conceived but not yet born." Many persons who
are not capable of making a will, such as infants and persons
of non-sane memory may be devisees, in as much as a devisee
is not based upon a consideration. (Wadsworth v. Wadsworth,
12 N.Y., 376). Excepting in Pa., there are no Statutes
of Mortmain and therefore the capacity of corporations to
take by devise depends upon the terms of the charters by
which they are created. The power to take and hold lamds is
usually conferred in special terms by the charter and a
limit fixed to the value of property which may thus be ac-
quired. "Such a limitation will apply to the value of the
land at the time of acquisition, and though an increase in
its value may subsequently occur, so that the limit is exceedi-
ed the property may still be retained. (In re McGraw, 111
N.Y., 66).
As to Aliens the modern rule is that they miay take tes-
tamentary gifts and devises of real estate and hold the same
as against all but the State.
Wills cannot effect the claims of creditors since it is
a principle of justice and sound policy that a testator
should disposd only of the suplus, after his just debts arp
paid and that all disposition in fraud of crediters should b-
set aside.
VOID TESTAMENTARY GIFTS
OR LIMITATIONS ON TESTAMENTARY P(.ER.
In the first place gifts may be void either because thp
object fails or because in conflict with some legal rule or
principle. The former is well illustrated by the case
where the legatee dies before the vesting of the legacy. As
to the latter there are certain principles that the testator
cannot over-ride. These are- (1) Rules as to the incidentt
of property which include rules as regards dower, curtesy nl
liability of property for debts. (2) Principles of inter-
pretation. (3) Rules of public policy and good morals. The
local conception of publie policy is liable in different
jurisdictions and at different epochs to great variance and
decisfions must greatly differ in consequence. Gifts whit,
fetter for an unreasonable time the free circulation of r'
money or property are pronounced invalid under this rule.
Prior to the Statute of Charitable Uses (43 Eliz.) devises
at law to charitable 'Lses generally, without implying a
24
trustee were void but it is not the policy of the modern law
to suffer a trust to fail for the want of a trustee and 
the
court has the power to appoint one.
RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION. (Cy pres)
SO far as mere interpretation is concerned, the testa-
tor's meaning or intention is the criterion, but in constru-
ing a will the object of the court is to ascertain not the
intention simply, but the express intention of the testator-
i.e. "the intention which the will itself either expressly or
by implication, declares," "The construction of a will is
always a matter for the court and should never be left to the
jury". (Ruffin v. Farmer, 72 I1., 615). Generally speaking
a will of real estate is construed according to the law of
the place where the land is situated, but a will of person-
alty is governed by the lex domicillii.
The rules for construing the language of a will are less
rigid thhn those applicable to other instrumwnts. They
are not to be viewed in a technical sense or required to con-
form to strict grammatical accuracy but rather to be taken
in their ordinary, natural and proper sense. "But if upon
so reading them in connection with the entire will and an
ambiguity arises, the primary meaning may be modified, ex-
tended or abridged in accordance with the presumed intention,
so far as to remove the difficulty." (Chrystie v. Phyfe, 19
N.Y., 548). Conflicting provisions should be reconciled so
as to conform to the manifest general intent and "it is only
in cases where such provisions are absolutely repugnant thd
any of them should be rejected." (Baxter v. Bowyer, 19 Oh.,
490). But if two parts of a will are conflicting and to-
tally irreconcilable, the latter must prevail. OPRATT v. Rice
7 Cush., 209). In the case of (Fetrous' Estate, 58 Pa.St.,
427) the Court laid down the following principle. "The in-
tention of the testator when properly proved is competent not
only to fix the sense of ambiguous words but to controle the
meaning of express words in case of difficulty and uncertain-
ty."
A will and codicil are to be construed together as parts
of one and the same instrument and the latter may, from its
very nature as an after-thought or amendment, confirm, alter
or revoke the former. (Brimmer v. Sohier, 1 Cush., 118).
Where an instrument is opened to two constructions, one con-
sistent and the other repugnant to law or one of which will
give effect to the whole and the 6ther to only a part of the
will, the former will prevail. (see Pruden v. Pruden, 14 0h.,
St., 251; Randenback's App., 87 Pa.St., 51). When a thing
is devised or granted, whatever may be necessary to its en-
joyment passes as an appurtenant to it. "Thus the devise of
a house or messuage will include the land on vhich the house
is built and will also be deemed, prima facie, to carry the
garden, orchard, stables and yard." (Rogers v. Smith, 4 Pa.
St., 93). A bequest to a charitable use receives a liberal
construction. Thus a devise to "the poor, needy and father-
less of this County," was held valid in the case (Fox v. Ylaol-
ison Co., 14 Allen, 555).as meaning the paupers supported
by the taxpayers of the County.
DX Pres doctrine is a mode of construction applied to
wills and means that when the testator evinces a particular
and a general intention, and the particular intention cannot
take effect, the instrument will be so construed as to give
effect to the general intent. "If a valid devise or be-
quest is made in trust for a charitable purpose, the general
nature of which is indicated and there is no intent expressed
to limit the bounty solely to the particular application: and
if after the death of the testator, the particular applica-
tion becomes impracticable, impossible or illegal the Court
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of Equity will apply it in a manner as near as possible to
the testator's particular directions and thus earry out his
general charitable intent." (Prof. Hutchins Lectures on Equitq
jurisprudence). In some states it is held to be a power
not to be exercised by the Courts. (Holmes v. Mead, 52 N.Y.,
344). In other states it is held to be of doubtful malid-
ity. (Harvard College v. Society, 3 Tray., 283).
RULES AS TO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
IN AID OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION.
Parol evidence is admissible to show the state of the
testator's mind, the nature, extent and condition of his
property, his relation to the contestants, and in fact all
the surrounding circumstances at the time of the execution of
the will. This is permitted in order to place the Court in
the place and condition of the testator, in order to enable
it the more accurately to understand the sense in which the
language of the will was used. "Courts of Equity cannot
however reform a will upon proof of mistake, though they may
reform a deed under sirnilar circumstances." (Button Exr. v.
Am. Tract Society, 23 Vt., 236). But paroi evidence may be
received to explain a latent ambiguity or local and technical
terms. (Mitchell V. Mithchell, 6 Md., 224). And in the
case of (Thomas v. Stevens, 4 John. Ch., 607) it was held
that "when a residuary legatee id described by a wrong Chris-
tian name, parol evidence is admissible to show who is intended.
PROBATE.
A brief outline of probate practice would not seem to be
irrelevant to the law of wills. By probate is meant the
proof before an authorized officer that an instrument is, in
fact, the last will of the deceased person whoA testamentary
act it is alleged to be. The death of the testator is a
condition precedent to the right of the Court to assume jur-
isdiction for until that time it is merely inchoate. Death
is presumed however from a continued absence of seven years,
nothing having in the meanwhile been heard ffom or of the
absent party. Although no definite time can be laid down in
which a will ~ust be probated it should be done in a reason-
able time. What is a reasonable time depends largely on
the circumstances and if there be an undue delay on the part
of the person whose duty it is probate it, any one interested
may petition the Court to cause him to show cause for his
dilatoriness. "All wills must be probated and until so es-
tablished, no title can be set up under them nor can they be
used as evidence of claims under them." (Swanzey v. Blakeman,
8 Oh., 5). However wills over thirty years old, coming
from the proper eustody and appearing regular and perfect are
deemed to prove themselves. (1 Greenl. Ev., sec., 21).
Formerly the Ecclesiastical Courts of England had jur-
isdiction of the probate of wills. But in the U.S. thiz
power has been granted to certain judicial officers who per-
form the duties formerly incumbent upon the Ordinary ..f the
Ecc. Court. The party offering the will for probate is
called the proponent, and the person disputing it the con-
testant.
Two methods of proving a will were recognized at common
law. These were known as the "Common form" and the "Solemn
form". The former was employed when the executor propound-
ed the will in the absence of pdrsons interested and without
citing them to be present. In the latter case the will
was presented to the Cout in the presence of witnesses who
were examined separately and secretl3 nd their depositions
reduced to writing. In this country proofs are not taken
until citation or notice has been issued to all interested.
The witnesses tetify on oath or affirmation that they were
present, saw the testator sign and ack owledge the will and
that to their best belief he was sane at the time. in case
a witness should move from the iturisdiction his testi1.on,
may be taken by commission or dedimus potestatem. Lost or
destroyed wills may be admitted to probate upon proper proofs
of their execution and subsequent loss. When a will has
been admitted to probate it must be registered in the office
of the Probate Judge or Clerk of the Court, together with the
proof thereof and the certificate admitting it to probate.
"When properly probated and not contested, it becomes operat-
ive from the time of the testator!s death." (Pitts v. else,
72 Ind., 469).
Foreign wills may be admitted to probate, when accom-
panied by a certificate from the proper officer alleging tht
they were duly executed and proved, and "they must be record-
ed before the title to land situated in another state vests."
(Nelson v. Tappan, 6 Oh.,172). Gross inequaldty in the
distribution of the property is not of itself ground for set-
ting aside a will. (Kevil v. 2 Bush., 614). A writing
in the form of a deed which conveys all of the property that
the maker may die possessed of, is a will, and as such it is
admissible in evidence rely after probate.
As the detaild of probate practice in the Several States
of the Union are regulated by Statute, it will naither be
practica le or consistent with the object of this thesis to
pursue the subject farther. Time and experience have sug-
gested the numerous change., in the law of testamentary dispo-
sition, that from time to time have been made. It is the
purpose of the Legislators and the Courts to frame and give
effect to sucl enactments as the wants of society demand.
And it may be asserted, and with truth, that the admirable
wisdom and justice which mark the laws relating to this im-
portant subject are the development and result of the exper-
ience, observation and wisdom of centuries.
FINIS.

